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ABSTRACT 
There is sufficient evidence that many private equity (PE) leveraged buyouts (LBOs) fail 
financially and during this process, destroy significant value for their investors, employees, 
partners, suppliers, customers, and the economy in the communities in which these businesses 
operate. PE firms acquire companies and manage them for a short time-period, typically under 7 
years, for the purpose of selling them at a higher price and with a high return on investment (ROI). 
The capital structure of such an acquisition is shaped as an LBO via an investment mix of 20-30 
percent in equity and 70-80 percent in debt, which forces the LBO to assume a large debt.  During 
the PE-LBO ownership period, PE partners focus on improving the LBO performance and on 
increasing its valuation with the objective of exiting the investment with large ROIs for their 
investors. To facilitate their objectives, the PE firm aligns the LBO’s leadership with its goals 
through changes in the leadership team and creative incentive plans. This research study 
investigates the influence of PE on innovation in PE LBOs, exploring factors that impact 
innovation and linking them to reasons for acquisition failures. Primarily, factors studied herein 
explore hypotheses about the effects of short-term ownership, management restructuring, 
management incentive plans, and debt size on new product development and innovation. Through 
the implementation of case study research utilizing surveys of LBO executives, this study uncovers 
challenges and opportunities that impact PE LBO acquisitions and gleans insight into potential 
mechanisms for successful financial outcomes.  As a result, this study details a rigorous, strategic, 
and systematic platform that highlights three PE engagement phases with an LBO company.  These 
phases include the acquisition phase, the planning phase, and the execution phase.  This platform 
facilitates decision making and provides guidelines and recommendations to help increase 
leadership focus on innovation and enhance the success rate of related investments and the future 
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success of LBOs. Notably, these guidelines are also applicable to the broader merger and 
acquisition (M&A) market. 
  




Pursuing a Ph.D. degree while juggling other priorities such as work, and family required 
a strong long-term commitment. I would not have been able to complete this journey without the 
endless support and sacrifice of my loving wife Paula. 
This dissertation was made possible with the help of many individuals. First of all, I would 
like to thank my friend, Dr. Gad Selig for planting this seed in my head during 2014-2015. Many 
thanks go to Dr. Elif Kongar who was always available to advise and guide me through the 
program. I also would like to express my gratitude to my professor and dissertation supervisor, Dr. 
Ruba Deeb, who invested endless time in reviewing my work and in providing me guidance. Many 
thanks also go to the Technology Management faculty professors and committee members, Drs. 
Christian Bach, Bruce Bowman, Ruba Deeb, Lesley Frame, Elif Kongar, Gad Selig, and Nasir 
Sheikh. 
Finally, after a 5-year commitment to this journey, I am going to invest my time in my 
family, including my loving children, Lindsay, Will, Ryan, my future daughter in law Marissa, 
and my adorable grandchildren, Jacob, Olivia, and Elle. 
  
Final Version – 08-20-2020 
 7 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................ 4 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................ 6 
TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................... 7 
LIST OF TABLES .............................................................................................................. 8 
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................ 9 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 10 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE SURVEY.......................................................................... 17 
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH PLAN AND DATA COLLECTION ................................... 22 
CHAPTER 4: RESULTS .................................................................................................. 30 
CHAPTER 5: DEVELOPMENT OF STARTEGIC GUIDELINES ................................ 43 
CHAPTER 6: VALIDATION OF STRATEGIC GUIDELINES .................................... 50 
CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION ....................................................... 69 
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................. 76 
Appendix A – IRB Research Approval ............................................................................ 80 
Appendix B – IRB Consent Form ..................................................................................... 81 
Appendix C – 1st Case Study Survey Questionnaire ........................................................ 85 
Appendix D – Definitions ............................................................................................... 100 
 
  
Final Version – 08-20-2020 
 8 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1- Success and failure definitions of PE LBOs……………………………………...... 12 
Table 2- Company profile of the 4 PE LBOs………………………………………………... 25 
Table 3- Survey participants’ profiles ...…………………………………………………….. 26 
Table 4- Participants rating against the 7 topics of the survey………………………………. 30 
Table 5- Investment outcome of companies A, B, C, and D ………………………………... 44 
Table 6- Profiles of expert participants in the case study survey……………………………. 50 
Table 7- Responses of the expert participants from case study 1……………………………. 55 
Table 8- Responses of the expert participants from case study 2……………………………. 56 
Table 9- Responses of the expert participants from case study 3……………………………. 58 
Table 10- Responses of the expert participants from case study 4…………………………... 61 
Table 11- Responses of the expert participants from case study 5…………………………... 63 
Table 12- Responses of the expert participants from case study 6…………………………... 71 
Table 13- Applicability of the recommended guidelines in the broader M&A market…….... 72 
 
Final Version – 08-20-2020 
 9 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1- Relationship between Investors, PE funds, PE firms, PE LBOs 
  
11 
Figure 2- Four factors that impact innovation 
 
13 
Figure 3- Relationship between investors, PE funds, PE firms, PE LBOs 
 
18 
Figure 4- Eisenhardt case study process 22 
Figure 5- Research method strategy 
 
23 
Figure 6- Implemented research plan for the survey 
 
24 
Figure 7- Encoded aggregated survey data 
 
29 
Figure 8- Investment outcome of the four companies in this research study 
 
31 
Figure 9- Participants’ role in their LBO 
 
32 
Figure 10- Investment duration period 
 
33 
Figure 11- Approval of new development projects that will complete after investment 
  
34 
Figure 12- Debt size, product budget increase, and market definition of participating 
   
36 
Figure 13- Indirect relationship between R&D investments and the debt size 
 
37 
Figure 14- Management turnover. management restructuring period, and loss of talent 
 
38 
Figure 15- Incentive mix plan and severance plan 
 
39 
Figure 16- Direct relationship between R&D investments and the stock options plan 
 
40 
Figure 17- Stock options and bonus plan relationship and their influence on innovation 
 
42 
Figure 18- PE engagement phases with LBO company 
 
44 
Figure 19- Process and recommended guidelines to determine the debt size 
 
45 
Figure 20- Management team creation process and guidelines 
 
46 
Figure 21- Incentive plan creation process 
 
48 
Figure 22- Project approval process 
 
49 
Figure 23- Project approval recommended guidelines – Final 
 
65 
Figure 24- Process and recommended guidelines to determine the debt size -Final 
 
66 
Figure 25- Management team creation process and guidelines – Final 
 
67 




Final Version – 08-20-2020 
 10 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. The Private Equity Industry  
The Private Equity (PE) industry is not a new phenomenon. It started in North America in 
the 1980s and expanded to the other world regions. One of the largest acquisitions that brought 
attention to the PE industry was the $25B acquisition of RJR Nabisco in 1989 by KKR. The 
acquisition process involved a bidding war between KKR and Shearson-Lehman-Hutton and 
became an example of corporate greed that is described in the book and the HBO TV series 
“Barbarians at the Gate: The Fall of RJR Nabisco” [1]. The recession of the early 1990s slowed 
down PE activities due to many LBO failures.  Today, LBO activities reached record level of 
acquisitions creating over a $1 trillion-dollar industry [2, 3].  
PE firms raise funds from institutional and wealthy individual investors. Institutions 
include pension, investment, and endowment funds, insurance companies, and banks. Individual 
investors include high net worth individuals and mutual funds [1, 4]. Once a target amount is 
reached, raised money is allocated to a fund which is then used by the PE firm to acquire, manage 
and sell businesses. Once money is committed to a fund, investors have minimal control or 
influence on the management of the fund’s assets. The life time of a PE fund is 10 years which can 
be extended by 2 years. At that time, each of these PE funds is closed and liquidated by selling all 
of its businesses after a pre-determined period of time. Ensuring a great track record of return on 
investment (ROI) in the range of 12-20 percent annual return from their previous investment funds 
enables PE firms to raise money for new funds. This great track record also allows PE firms to 
charge their investors a fee of 1.5-2 percent on the assets under management as well as a 20 percent 
fee on all fund profits [1, 5, 6]. The relationship between Investors, PE firms, their acquisitions, 
and creditors is illustrated in figure 1. 
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PE firms use their funds to acquire companies and manage them for a short time-period, 
typically under 7 years, for the purpose of selling them at a higher price and with a high ROI. A 
targeted company can be privately or publicly held and as a result of the acquisition, if publicly 
held, it is removed from the public markets and becomes private. Acquired companies are 
controlled by the acquiring PE firms through the creation of a small board of directors with a 
majority of PE partners. The capital structure of such an acquisition is shaped as a leveraged buyout 
(LBO) via an investment mix of 20-30 percent in equity and 70-80 percent in debt, which forces 
the LBO to assume a large debt with creditors.  During the following 4-6 years of ownership, PE 
partners focus on improving the performance of their LBO and on increasing its valuation with the 
objective of exiting the investment with large profits for their investors. To facilitate their 
objectives, the PE firm aligns the LBO’s leadership with its goals through changes in the leadership 




Figure 1: Relationship between investors, PE funds, PE firms, PE LBOs. 
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1.2 Research Problem and Scope 
Despite growth in the industry, previous research studies show that many LBOs fail. These 
numbers are quite large and should be investigated to help identify the root cause of these failures 
and provide recommendations that will help increase the success rate of these investments. Table 
1 provides definitions for success, failure, post exit outcome and impact. 
Failures of LBOs are not only detrimental to the investors, but also to the employees, the 
entire value chain and the communities in which they operate. The goal of this research is to 
uncover reasons for failures and provide recommendations that will enhance the success rate of 
investments and the future success of the LBOs. More specifically, this research study investigates 
the influence of PE firms on R&D innovation in their LBOs, exploring hypotheses about factors 
that impact innovation and how they may correlate to LBO failures. Key factors that are explored 
herein are illustrated in figure 2 and described below.  
Table 1: Success and failure definitions of PE LBOs 
 
Final Version – 08-20-2020 
 13 
One factor is the short-term ownership period. PE firms’ investment horizon is 4-6 years 
[7] and the organic development of a new product to completion could require 2-3 years. 
Therefore, the first hypothesis H1 is that as the investment period approaches its last few years, 
new product development is not approved by the LBO leadership. The logic behind it is that 
new product development approval will require an increase in R&D spending, will not generate 
new revenues during the PE ownership, and therefore will negatively influence the LBO’s 
valuation prior to the exit.  
Another factor is the high debt that an LBO company procures during the process of 
acquisition. This factor forces the LBO leadership to focus on short-term objectives such as using 
the business cash flow to pay debt. This is achieved through efficiency improvements in the form 
of improved processes and headcount reductions while discouraging entrepreneurship and long-
term innovation that require increased R&D budget. The second hypothesis H2 is that the 
leadership of an LBO with a large debt does not increase R&D spending. The third factor 
explored herein is the alignment of LBO management with its PE firm’s objectives. Some PE firms 
choose to replace the executive team to achieve better alignment and stronger business results. 
While changes at the leadership level could be positive, a complete overhaul of the leadership team 
will generate negative outcomes that include: 1) Poor business decision making at the executive 
 
Figure 2: Four factors that impact innovation. 
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level due to lack of market and product expertise, and 2) High employee turnover and a significant 
loss of knowledge, talent, and competitive advantage. Consequently, the third hypothesis H3 is 
that a significant and rapid change of the leadership team results in a large loss of talent. 
Lastly, the fourth factor that impacts innovation is the use of the incentive plan as another method 
of alignment of the LBO management with the PE firm’s objective. This incentive plan should 
have the correct mix of ingredients such as high salary, bonus plan, stock options and severance 
plan that will correctly align the executive team with the PE firm’s objectives. If the incentive plan 
is not designed properly, the LBO leadership will lack in motivation to perform and drive the 
business appropriately. For example, since stock options drive long-term behavior and bonus plans 
reward the leadership on short-term performance of the LBO, if the bonus plan generates better 
financial reward, then the leadership will be focused on short-term gains rather than the valuation 
of the company at its exit. The fourth hypothesis H4 is that stock options plans that are generous 
and achievable motivate the LBO leadership to invest in innovation. Conversely, stock 
options plans that are unachievable or provide unattractive payout, result in a leadership 
team that is unmotivated to invest in innovation. 
1.3 Research Methods  
Unlike prior published research that is based on public data or surveys of PE partners, this 
research is based on data that is collected from LBO executives through personal interviews. The 
reason for the decision of utilizing case study survey is to retrieve experiential data from objective 
experts in the field. Most of these executives are no longer associated with the LBOs that employed 
them, and therefore are able to respond to the survey in an unbiased manner that does not pose a 
conflict of interest, and without concerns that there will be retaliation from current employers. 
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This research method implements a qualitative design in the form of case studies that utilize 
two surveys covering topics that explore, validate or invalidate the aforementioned factors (see 
Section 1.2). Both surveys utilize a questionnaire that is made of close-ended questions to provide 
consistent data collection. The first survey is used for gathering data to validate study hypotheses.  
The second questionnaire is used to validate decision flow charts created from the knowledge 
gained as a result of addressing study hypotheses.  FreeMind is used for mapping and visualizing 
processes and Microsoft Office is used to create diagrams and to organize data, generate charts, 
and perform visual relationship analysis of variables. 
1.4 Motivation Behind the Research  
There are 4 motives for this research study. The first motive is a significant gap in the 
literature due to mixed reported results from prior research of innovation in PE LBOs. Researchers 
who are critics of PE firms indicate that innovation activities at their LBOs are suppressed due to 
the short-term horizon of the PE portfolio companies, while researchers who are advocates of PE 
firms claim that their LBOs are more efficient as well as innovative. The second motive is that 
since many of the LBOs fail, it is important to conduct additional research in this area that will 
help identify whether lack of innovation is a root cause for these failures. The third motive is that 
there is a need for developing decision making blueprints that guide PE LBO executives through 
critical decision making during the very short timeline of acquisition and exit processes.   The 
fourth motive is the vested interest of the researcher in improving the success rate of the LBOs 
given his knowledge of best practices in this field. As an LBO executive (VP of Software 
Development) from 2001 to 2006 under the ownership of one PE firm and from 2006 to 2014 
(Senior VP of R&D) under the ownership of a different PE firm, these thirteen years brought 
challenges as well as opportunities. These 2 periods of acquisition were very different and helped 
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shape a strong understanding of the agent theory and the important role of senior management in 
driving the LBO business on behalf of the PE.  Additionally noted was the impact of the debt and 
the short-term ownership factors that PE LBOs experience as well as a significant insight to how 
LBO companies are managed. Therefore, the research topic addressed herein is driven by 
significant expertise and brings a new perspective to this area of research. 
1.5 Potential Contribution of the Proposed Research  
This research will extend existing knowledge through a new source of data that will be 
used to validate or invalidate the hypotheses that influence LBO success. By evaluating the 4 
hypothetical factors that can influence PE investments, we aim to fulfill the study objectives and 
recommend a set of guidelines that will improve the success rate of PE firms in their pursuit of a 
successful outcome for their investors as well as for their LBO companies and employees, the 
LBOs’ value chain, and the economy for their surrounding communities. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE SURVEY 
2.1 Private Equity Firms - Background 
The PE industry has grown tremendously in the last 3 decades. Despite their growth and 
popularity, PE firms’ financials and operational activities are not well understood, which is mainly 
attributed to the fact that these firms are exempt from public disclosure requirements [8]. 
Regardless, significant but inconclusive research was conducted in this area. Researchers who are 
critics of PE firms suggest that long-term growth such as investments in technology and 
innovation, is suppressed due to the short-term horizon of the PE portfolio companies, while 
researchers who are advocates of PE firms believe that these portfolio companies are more efficient 
and also pursue long-term growth [6]. Despite the differences in opinions, it is evident that many 
of the LBOs fail. Cumming et al [9] report that during the period 1985-2005 in the UK, there were 
1431, or ~ 12 percent LBO failures in a form of default out of 12,267 buyouts. These numbers are 
quite large and should motivate additional research in this area to help identify the root cause and 
provide recommendations that will help increase the success rate of these investments. 
2.2 Private Equity Firms Short-Term Investment Influence on Innovation 
Short-term strategies can negatively impact future business growth since R&D investments 
and short-term profits do not concur. Such conflicts may result in decisions that reduce investments 
in R&D [10]. Researchers who are advocates of PE firms assert that despite the short-term 
investment horizon of the PE ownership, LBO managers still invest in long-term activities, 
including increasing their patent portfolio [11, 12]. On the other hand, researchers who are PE 
firms’ critics assert that LBOs don’t invest in long-term activities since they will not realize the 
benefits of such investments [13]. Some of these critics state that the requirement to meet short-
term performance objectives conflicts with the importance of reaching a competitive advantage, 
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where the leadership might replace long-term rewarding investment opportunities with lower cost 
and less risky short-term development projects [14-16]. Others critics state that LBO leaders 
reduce or postpone long-term projects because they will not endure to benefit from the outcome 
[16]. Short-term strategies vs. long-term ones are depicted in figure 3. 
2.3  Influence of Debt Management on LBOs Innovation Activities 
Companies that operate under a large debt use their cash flow to reduce their debt rather 
than investing it in new business opportunities [17, 18]. The need to service the debt forces LBOs 
to implement a number of strategies. They may restructure to increase control over the company’s 
operation, improve efficiencies, sell unprofitable lines of business or assets, and scrutinize all 
future investment projects and strategic innovation [9, 19-21]. It is also evident that despite being 
highly leveraged, some LBOs are still able to find ways to invest in future R&D programs. One 
practice is for the executives to emphasize a strategic approach for building an organization for the 
long-run rather than focusing on tactical short-term reductions in R&D spending. This can be 
achieved through a SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats) analysis of the 
 
Figure 3: Short-term vs. long-term strategies. 
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company, redefinition of the mission statement, and through actions that improve R&D function 
while eliminating non-strategic company functions and nonessential projects. As an example, Levi 
Strauss, following its 1985 LBO, reevaluated its competitive position and recognized that the jean 
market reached its declining life cycle and took strategic actions to recover. Levi Strauss shut down 
plants while devoting resources to its primary products. The company invested heavily in R&D, 
focusing on new product development, which resulted in strong financial outcomes. Another 
practice on how an LBO can correctly invest in R&D is to clearly define the long-term and short-
term activities in R&D, the desired types of R&D activities, and their timing. Mission statements 
for the R&D functions should be established to help achieve company goals by enhancing the 
required competencies. The successes of Harley Davidson, Duracell and Reliance Electric are the 
result of redefinition and rebuilding of desired competitive competencies in these companies. 
Another practice is to allocate R&D resources with a full understanding of the industry norms and 
the company’s goals. Post its 1987 LBO, Uniroyal Chemical increased its R&D spending by 15 
percent to develop new products in order to gain market share in its competitive market [22]. 
2.4 Influence of Management Restructuring on LBOs Performance 
Since PE firms are active investors who often control the boards of directors of their 
portfolio companies (LBOs), they take measures to improve their performance. Notably, one of 
these actions is to replace existing LBO leaders with new and competent managers that will create 
a stronger management team [23]. However, it is not always clear if the new recruits possess the 
appropriate skill set that is needed to successfully lead LBO organizations. Exploring why some 
LBOs are more entrepreneurial and innovative than others, suggests a strong relationship with the 
entrepreneurial mindset of senior managers [24]. It is also evident that such restructuring of the 
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management team can impact competitiveness due to loss of value and talent [4, 9] which is one 
of the focus areas of this research topic. 
2.5 Influence of Incentive Plans on Leadership Behavior 
Incentive plans are designed to promote a desired behavior which is why companies align 
executives with their business objectives through the inclusion of incentive plans in their 
compensation package. For example, a large grant of stock options compensation plan that 
includes a specific current and prospective options mix, would influence the behavior of CEOs to 
make the desired short and long-term business related investments and decisions [25]. Companies 
use short-term incentives in the form of annual bonus plans that are designed to reward employees 
for performance. In order to motivate innovation, they design incentive plans that reward long-
term success and disregard early failures. Such optimal incentive plans are created from a mix of 
stock options, option repricing, and attractive severance plans [26]. The total compensation plan 
for the executive team is designed to incentivize them to maximize the company’s value [27]. It is 
also evident that a carefully crafted compensation plan that increases the potential wealth of the 
management team, will improve the performance of a firm and its innovation [28]. This idea is 
also confirmed by other published work highlighting that managers who do not receive stock 
options, do not invest in innovation, while the ones that receive the options will invest in R&D 
[29]. Basically, research results support the idea that short-term and long-term investments can 
successfully co-exist if well-crafted compensation plans are implemented [30]. 
2.6 Summary 
This literature review is focused on the 4 factors and hypotheses that are investigated in 
the research study. At the onset of this study, it was necessary to validate that a significant number 
of LBO failures justify the purpose for this research investigation. Furthermore, the available 
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literature that spans approximately 3 decades indicates that the academic knowledge contribution 
in the area of PE LBO provides mixed results and is inconclusive, which provides another 
motivation to conduct this research. In addition, most of the published results described herein 
were derived from the analysis of sources such as public data sets, private data sets, or surveys 
with PE partners. However, this research study describes a novel approach for investigating PE-
LBOs by introducing a new data source, which is made of ex-LBO executives who provide 
information on experiential knowledge they gained in leading LBO companies. The collected 
information is objective since participants are no longer associated with their previous companies 
and pose no conflict of interest or concerns that there will be retaliation from current employers. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH PLAN AND DATA COLLECTION 
3.1 Research Method 
The research method described herein is qualitative. Unlike prior research that uses public 
data or survey results from PE partners, this study is based on case study surveys where data is 
collected from LBO executives. The majority of LBO executives that are participating in the 
research are no longer associated with the LBOs that employed them or with the PE firms that 
owned their LBO, and therefore are able to participate in the case study and respond to the survey 
without concerns that there will be retaliation from current employers.  
The case study process is depicted in figure 4. It starts with the creation of a questionnaire. 
The topics and the questions are derived from the literature survey and prior LBO experience. A 
small number of interviews with LBO executives are performed to validate and calibrate the survey 
questions. The survey is then performed and data is collected, aggregated and analyzed to build 
the theory of this study [31]. 
 
Figure 4: Eisenhardt case study process [31]. 
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In this regard, the study plan implements a UB Institutional Review Board (IRB) approved 
case study survey research with the intention to interview and evaluate 2 test groups. The first 
group includes 3 successful PE LBOs and the second group consists of 3 failed PE LBOs as 
highlighted in figure 5. The study population would include at least 4 executives from each of the 
LBOs totaling a minimum of 24 participants. Although the population is limited to 24 participants, 
this limitation will be overcome by consensus of 10 experts. Interviews will be conducted in person 
or via video or phone. To facilitate consistent data collection, an IRB-approved questionnaire was 
designed to specifically focus on topics that will help investigate the influence of leadership on 
corporate innovation in PE LBOs, exploring hypotheses about factors that impact innovation and 
how they may correlate to LBO failures. A schematic representation of the data collection strategy 
is provided in figure 5. 
3.2 Implementation and Test Plan 
 
Figure 5: IRB-approved research method strategy. 
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The survey plan for 6 companies and 24 participants was changed due to difficulties in 
identifying and securing participants from 6 companies, especially during the COVID 19 pandemic 
months. Identifying the LBOs and the participants for the interviews required many months of 
networking. An initial approach was to contact colleagues from past employment and to obtain 
their consent to participate in the survey.  Another approach was to reach deep into the network of 
school alumni and identify individuals that were or are corporate executives and then to contact 
them via LinkedIn. Phone calls or in person meetings were established with executives that 
responded which led to either obtaining additional contacts or reaching a dead end. After many 
months of networking activities, 22 participants from 4 companies were identified and data 
collection started. Figure 6 describes the adjusted research plan used herein. The companies are 
mid-size US technology companies that operate predominantly in the financial market and the 
 
Figure 6: Implemented research plan for the survey. 
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participants are executives that served in key roles at these companies. The profiles of the 22 
participants and their 4 LBO companies are shown in table 2 and table 3.  
Table 2: Company profile of the 4 PE LBOs. 
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In order to provide consistent data, the questionnaire consisted of closed-ended questions. 
The questionnaire covered 7 topics where questions were grouped into the corresponding sections: 
1. Background – This section was designed to corroborate existing literature, to validate the 
4 hypotheses, and for understanding the following: a) LBO company type before acquisition; b) 
The duration of PE ownership; c) The role of the participant after the acquisition; d) Was the 
participant a new hire post LBO? e) Was the LBO a technology company? 
2. Investment – This section was designed to corroborate existing literature, to validate H2, 
the second hypothesis, and to understand: a) The initial investment mix and provide a good idea 
on the size of the debt; b) Any additional investments the PE firm made during the acquisition? c) 
What was the investment mix of the additional investment if any? d) What was the source of the 
additional investment if any? 
Table 3: Survey participants’ profiles. 
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3. Incentives & Retention – This section was designed to corroborate existing literature, to 
validate H4, the fourth hypothesis, and to collect data that clarifies how a PE firm incentivizes its 
LBO management and the magnitude or impact of each incentive. Specifically: a) What incentives 
did the participant receive? b) What was the vesting formula for the stock options? c) How many 
layers of management were offered incentive plans? d) How meaningful were the options to the 
recipient? e) How meaningful was the bonus plan to the recipient? f) How secure was the 
participant in his/her role? 
4. Employee Turnover – This section was designed to corroborate existing literature, to 
validate H3, the third hypothesis, and to collect data that helps understand whether a PE firm has 
an impact on employee turnover, thus leading to a loss of talent and competitive advantage. The 
questions were therefore designed as follows: a) Was the LBO CEO replaced? b) What percentage 
of senior management was replaced? c) What percentage of second layer management left the 
company? d) What was the duration of the restructuring? e) Was there a major loss of talent? 
5. Market – This section was designed to validate H2, the second hypothesis, and to help 
understand the size of the company and its ability to generate growth. More specifically: a) The 
total addressable market; b) The market rate of growth; c) The LBO’s market share.  
6. Innovation – This section was designed to corroborate existing literature, to validate the 4 
hypotheses, and to clarify how a PE firm invests in the product innovation process. More 
specifically: a) What was the R&D budget as percentage of revenues pre and post LBO? b) Did 
investment in product development post LBO increase and when did it happen during the 
investment period? c) Describe the pattern of the increase (e.g. one time, as needed, etc.); d) 
Describe the reason for the increase (e.g. new product, product enhancement, etc.); e) What were 
the sources of funding for existing and new product development? f) Describe organic product 
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development strategies; g) Describe merger and acquisition (M & A) strategies; h) Describe 
product development strategies (e.g. incremental, radical/disruptive, etc.); i) What was the average 
duration of new product development? j) Did the LBO introduce any new flagship products? k) 
Did the LBO approve product development that will only complete after the investment exit? 
7. Investment Exit – This last section was designed to validate the 4 hypotheses, and to 
clarify exit outcomes: a) Was the exit a financial success? b) Did new products influence success? 
c) Is the company successful post exit? 
Interviews were scheduled and conducted either by phone or in person. The questionnaire, 
consent form, and a short description about the research topic and objectives were emailed to each 
participant a few days prior to the interview to give them ample time to review and sign the consent 
form and prepare for the interview. The questionnaire was revised multiple times during the first 
4 interviews based on feedback from the participants that were explicitly asked to comment on the 
quality of the questions. Collected data was aggregated and analyzed to identify patterns that 
validate or invalidate a role for innovation impact factors in PE-LBOs described in section 1.2. 
Although interviews focused on answering close-ended questions, participants were free to 
elaborate on their answers and to provide their points of view. Answers for close-ended questions 
were collected at the end of each interview and added to a data table that aggregated all answers 
in an encoded methodology designed to protect the privacy of participants. Most importantly, the 
aggregation of data enabled the identification of patterns that correlate to the factors that influence 
innovation.  Figure 7 illustrates the aggregation methodology for the data.  
The 7 topics covered by the questionnaire are shown in the top row and the associated 
questions are grouped under the topic title in row 3, where each question occupies a column. Each 
row, from row 4 to row 29, represents a participant and the answers that s/he provided. The 
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participant name and the LBO name are encoded in column A to protect the participant’s privacy.  
A number of patterns are highlighted with the aid of a green or a red rectangle that helped identify, 
validate, or invalidate assumptions or hypotheses. For example, under question 2 regarding the 
Employee Turnover topic, the participants of company C responded with “d” as their answer. This 
answer indicates that more than 60 percent of the senior management was replaced by the new PE 
ownership. 
As part of the survey, participants were also rated against their expertise in each of the 7 
topics of the survey. The rating is subjective and is based on the knowledge each participant 
exhibited when answering questions for each of the topics. Table 4 depicts the expertise of the 
participants in each of the topic areas which is rated on a scale of 1 to 5, where 5 is the highest 
score and 1 is the lowest score. 
 
Figure 7: Encoded aggregated survey data. 
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Table 4: Participants rating against the 7 topics of the survey. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
4.1 Establishing a Baseline 
Participants in the survey represented 4 companies that for confidentiality reasons are 
named herein as A, B, C, and D. In order to validate or invalidate the aforementioned factors that 
impact innovation (see Section 1.2), it was important to establish a baseline. The first step was to 
identify the investment outcomes for each of the 4 companies. Survey results shown in figure 8 
identify company C as a failed LBO relative to the others as evident by the data in the chart that 
clearly shows that none of the participants (of 4 participants) from company C indicated that the 
company was successful. It is important to also note that company C did not exit its investment 
yet although the indicators that it was failing to produce a strong ROI for the PE investors are quite 
strong. On the other hand, executives of company B provided a mixed response where 80 percent 
believed that the outcome was a success while 20 percent thought that it failed. Additional 
discussions with participants from company B on this topic helped clarify a few key points about 
the mixed results. The first point is that if results are judged purely by financial numbers, the 
investment result was break-even with a flat ROI. The second point asserts that operating in the 
 
Figure 8: Investment outcome of the four companies in this research study. 
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financial market during the devastating 2008/2009 financial crisis and still delivering break-even 
financial results in 2014 should be considered a remarkable success. Lastly, the third point 
provides practical granularity from a financial investment perspective. The PE firm wrote-down 
the investment during the financial crisis, accepted it as a loss in its books, and adjusted down the 
initial equity investment. Therefore. the exit price in relationship to the adjusted original 
investment value, produced a significant ROI for the investors. 
Another set of results helped establish the credibility of LBO participants. Figure 9 
emphasizes the credibility of data received from senior level executives of LBOs in this research. 
Figure 9 shows the distribution of the role that the participants held at their LBO companies. A 
few participants were CEOs, most participants were senior executives, and some functioned in a 
vice-president role which was a second management level in their corresponding companies. 
Another important result that helped establish the baseline for this research study was to 
confirm that the investment period duration is consistent with what the literature reports. Figure  
 
 
Figure 9: Participants’ role in their LBO. 
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10 shows that the duration of PE ownership was less than 10 years.  Therefore, results from this 
study survey indeed corroborate data published in the literature [4, 32, 33]. 
Most of the LBO participants experienced an ownership duration of 5-7 years. It is 
important to note that company B was sold after 8 years because the 2008/2009 financial crisis 
disrupted the market and influenced the PE firm to extend the investment duration to give its LBO 
time to recover and deliver a better financial outcome to its investors. Company C did not exit the 
investment at the time of the survey which was reflected by the N/A (not applicable) response. 
Baseline information established thus far, identifies companies A, B, and D as successful 
LBOs and company C as a failed one (Figure 8). Additionally, we learned that the participants 
were LBO executives that served in key roles (Figure 9) such as corporate executives whose job 
titles typically start with 'Chief' and end with 'Officer’ (CxO), Senior Vice President, or Vice 
President and possessed unique and insightful knowledge that was valuable for this research 
project. Lastly, baseline results from figure 10 validate that PE firms’ investment duration is short 
and under ten years. 
 
Figure 10: Investment duration period. 
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4.2 Private Equity Firms Short-Term Investment Influence on Innovation 
Once the baseline was established, the next logical step was to validate or invalidate the 
first innovation factor which is the short-term ownership period. Figure 11 visualizes the data 
collected from the participants in response to 3 related survey questions. Regarding approvals of 
projects near the end of the investment period shown in figure 11A, most participants stated that 
new product development projects that would have completed after the exit were never approved. 
We can see that all of company A, most of company B, and the majority of company D participants, 
made this statement, while the participants of company C stated that the topic was not applicable 
because the exit date was not determined yet. It is important to note that at the time of the survey, 
company C was owned by its PE firm close to 5 years and therefore was entering the last few years 
of the PE ownership. 
The duration of new product development at each participants’ LBO helps us understand 
at what point in time of the investment period, a PE firm will stop approving new product 
development. This important data illustrates that even PE firms that indeed increased R&D 
investment, stopped doing so 2-3 years prior to the exit event. Results from participants to this 
 
Figure 11: Approval of new development projects that will complete after investment exit. 
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question that are shown in figure 11B, indicate that since product development duration in 
company A was 1-2 years, company A did not approve new product development in the last 1-2 
years of the PE ownership. Although company B participants provided a wider range for product 
development project duration of up to 3 years, we observe that the company did not approve new 
product development projects in the last 2 years of the PE ownership, which is corroborated by 
figure 12B that shows company B increasing their R&D budget only during years 3 through 6 of 
the 8-year PE ownership. Participants from company C provided sufficient indication that their 
LBO will act similarly to company A and will most likely stop approving new projects in the final 
1-3 years of the investment period. This is because company C has not increased its R&D budget 
(Figure 12B) after the first 3 years of the PE ownership and its new product development project 
duration was 1-3 years. On the other hand, company D participants provided a wider range than 
company B’s new project duration, where some participants felt that most new projects were 
shorter than 1 year. It is very likely that projects of under 1-year duration were approved even in 
the last year of the ownership, which is corroborated by the feedback in figure 12B that shows that 
company D increased R&D funding as needed. 
Based on results from figure 11, we can ascertain that the LBO leadership at the 4 
companies investigated in this study are not likely to approve new product development in the 
final 1-2 years of the investment. This is consistent with the observations that the companies in 
this study did not approve projects that would complete after the investment exit.  
4.3 Influence of Debt Management on LBOs Innovation Activities 
The size of the debt that an LBO manages is another factor that impacts innovation. Figure 
12A provides a depiction of the debt size at the participating companies and shows that company 
C acquired the largest debt since more than 80 percent of the company value was in debt.  Company 
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A and B had the lowest debt size while company D’s debt was in the 70-75 percent of the purchase 
price. These ratios are understandable when we view the market definition in figure 12C.  PE firms 
do not highly leverage companies that operate in a high growth market since the high ROI would 
come from the natural growth of the business in such market environment. Figure 12C illustrates 
that company D operated in a high growth market and had a lower debt to equity ratio while 
company C operated in a mature/low-growth market and had a very high debt of 80-90 percent of 
the total purchase price. 
The relationship between debt size and the propensity of LBO leadership to increase the 
R&D budget was addressed by the survey and results are shown in figures 12A & 12B. To illustrate 
this relationship, we generated a cluster plot to highlight the association between R&D investments 
and debt size. Using results from 22 participants, we visualize an indirect relationship between 
R&D spend during investment period and debt size (Figure 13). 
 
Figure 12: Debt size, development budget increase, and market definition of participating LBOs 
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When reviewing whether companies A through D increased their R&D budget during the 
PE firm’s ownership, it is evident that while a very small number of participants from company C 
believed that their company increased R&D investments, the majority did not experience an 
increase or were not aware of it. On the other hand, participants from companies A, B, and D 
provided more convincing and consistent data about increases in R&D budget and the timing of 
such increases. Results show an indirect relationship between the size of the debt and an increase 
in R&D investment. This is evident in figure 12A where company C that had the highest debt also 
shows a lackluster increased investment in R&D in figure 12B. 
4.4  Influence of Management Restructuring on LBOs Performance 
The alignment of LBO management with the PE firm’s objective is another focal point in 
the questionnaire. Figure 14A captures the turnover rate of the senior management team in each of 
the 4 companies. Figure 14B shows the duration of the leadership restructure process, and figure 
14C displays the resulting loss of talent in the 4 LBOs in this study. 
 
Figure 13: Indirect relationship between R&D investment and the debt size. 
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Figure 14 shows that companies A and B replaced less than 20 percent of senior managers 
whereas company C replaced greater than 60 percent of its senior management team (Figure 14A) 
in less than one year (Figure 14B), and company D replaced under 60 percent of its senior 
management (Figure 14A) in the first 2 years (Figure 14B). Results in figure 14 indicate that 
companies A and B that introduced only small leadership changes, did not experience loss of talent 
(Figure 14C), while the actions of replacing most of the senior management team in company C 
resulted in loss of talent as shown in figure 14C. Company D’s data was inconsistent and therefore 
it is challenging to determine what percentage of the senior management team was replaced. 
Nevertheless, a few hypotheses can be raised to explain why company D did not experience 
loss of talent when replacing many leaders in the organization. One hypothesis is that the new 
(replacement) leadership in company D was composed of strong leaders that brought value and 
contributed to the success of company D, while the new (replacement) leadership in company C 
 
Figure 14: Senior management turnover. senior management restructuring period, and loss of talent 
relationships. 
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was not effective in adding value to the company. Another hypothesis is that the replacement 
activities in company D did not trickle down in the organization and that most of the next layers 
of management were left untouched, thus leading to minimal to no loss of talent. These hypotheses 
should become objectives for future research. 
4.5  Influence of Incentive Plans on Leadership Behavior 
The fourth innovation factor of focus in this research was the composition of the incentive 
plan, its ability to align the LBO leadership with the investors, to provide a good balance of short-
term and long-term behavior, and most importantly, to influence innovative activities that are long-
term in nature. Figure 15A shows that the senior teams in this study’s 4 companies received a mix 
of bonus and stock options plans where some also received a high salary. Participant responses 
corroborated literature reports in that PE firms align the LBO executives with their objectives 
through compensation and incentive plans that include high salary, mix of stock options and bonus 
plans, and severance plans. Figure 15B, highlights the severance plans in companies A-D.  
 
 
Figure 15: Incentive mix plan and severance plan. 
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The importance of the severance plan and specifically its duration is that executives with a 
severance plan of 6 months and greater will feel empowered to take more risk and make difficult 
decisions without the fear of losing their jobs. Figure 15B shows that the executive team in 
company B received the most generous plan while the executives in company D had the shortest-
term plan.  
To demonstrate the impact of a strong stock options plan on the innovative behavior of 
LBO leadership, we generated a cluster plot to visualize the relationship between the stock options 
plan and R&D investments from the survey data. The cluster plot (Figure 16) suggests a direct 
relationship between the two variables.  
In reviewing the stock options plans from figure 17A, company D had the most gracious 
plan since the recipients became stock owners with full or time-based vesting upon the initiation 
of the plan. Company A had the next best plan since the stock options were vested over time 
 




Figure 16: Direct relationship between R&D investments and the stock options plan. 
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regardless of company performance. Companies B and C provided stock options plans that were 
based on performance and time. Company B’s performance vesting formula was aligned with 
annual revenue and margins targets while company C’s performance metrics were strongly tied to 
the valuation of the company at the investment exit. During the interview process, it became clear 
that in company C, the value of the options was below their exercise price (“under water”) and that 
the executives were no longer motivated by the plan. In observing the response distribution of 
company C participants in figure 17B, we can assert that it favors the “nice to have” or “N/A” (not 
applicable), which further supports the point above regarding the lack of long-term alignment these 
executives had with their PE firm. On the other hand, figure 17B shows that most of the 
participants in companies A, B, and D felt that upon an investment exit event, these options 
represented a life changing event for them or a great addition to their wealth, clearly motivating 
them to invest in the long-term valuation of the business. Figure 17C provides an additional data 
point about company D that expanded the stock options plan to also include its key employees to 
motivate them to commit to long-term plans, which are typically R&D projects. Figure 17D shows 
the size of the bonus as percentage of salary. The distribution of the plan across the 4 companies 
indicates that most of the participants were receiving an annual bonus plan in the range of 30-60 
percent of their pay which is a nice addition to the participants’ income but not a life changing 
event. Further analysis shows that the mix of incentives in company C is likely to influence short-
term behavior. This is attributed to the fact that the bonus plan was very generous while the stock 
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options plan was not incentivizing the executives. This is because the stock options plan is tied to 
the company’s valuation at the exit and was not adjusted to account for the fact that company C 
was under performing at the time the survey was conducted. In this scenario, it is questionable 
whether any company C executive was motivated to invest in long-term innovative activities. 
Company B, on the other hand provided a similar bonus plan to that of company C. Its stock 
options were more attractive, and the PE firm also added additional value by playing a more active 
role in motivating company B’s management team. The stock options were vested based on time 
and company performance, but when the financial crisis of 2008/2009 brought down the value of 
the stock options, the PE partners repriced the options by lowering their exercise price in order to 
keep the management team motivated. This resulted in a committed management team that 
invested its time and energy in the success of company B.  
 
Figure 17: Stock Options and Bonus Plan relationship and their influence on innovation. 
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CHAPTER 5: DEVELOPMENT OF STARTEGIC GUIDELINES 
5.1 Preliminary Conclusions 
 This research project encompassed results from a prepared questionnaire survey conducted 
in person or via phone interviews with participants that were in the role of executive management 
at 4 PE LBOs named companies A, B, C, and D. We addressed the 4 hypotheses (H1-H4) that 
were raised in section 1.2. In particular, for the first hypothesis (H1) that addresses the effect of 
short-term ownership period on new product development, we demonstrated that due to the short-
term nature of the investment period, new product development projects are unlikely to be 
approved as the company nears the last years of the investment horizon. We also showed that the 
size of debt is indirectly related to increases in the R&D budget as stated by the second hypothesis 
(H2). The higher the debt, the less likely that the management team will increase the R&D 
investment. We also confirmed our prediction from the third hypothesis (H3), that the speed and 
the size of restructuring the leadership team correlated significantly with talent loss and reduction 
in business performance. Lastly, we validated the fourth hypothesis (H4) arguing that the 
composition of incentive plans helps align the executive team with PE objectives.   Indeed, results 
show the influence of the incentive plan on innovation and long-term success. We first confirmed 
that the mix of incentive plans in the 4 companies included a bonus plan, stock options plan, high 
salary, and severance which is corroborated by literature reports. We show that the PE firm that 
imposed the strictest guidelines for the options plan resulted in an unmotivated management team 
with a potentially poor business outcome. The PE firm that understood the potential downside of 
an ineffective stock options plan and ensured that the LBO leadership stayed motivated by 
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adjusting the exercise price of the stock options plan, was rewarded with a successful financial 
outcome. Table 5 depicts the investment outcomes of the 4 LBOs in this research project with 
attention to post exit status, impact on investors, employees, value chain and the surrounding 
communities. 
5.2 Preliminary Recommended Guidelines 
 The primary objective from this research project is to recommend a set of guidelines that 
will help improve the success rate of PE firms in their pursuit of a successful outcome for their 
investors. The recommendations listed below are focused on the 4 hypotheses (H1-H4) examined 
herein and described above as key to the success of the innovative process and the successful 
Table 5: Investment outcome of companies A, B, C, and D. 
 
Preliminary Research Baseline – Investment Outcome
Company Outcome Exit Event Post Exit Status Impact
A, B, D Success PE and investors 





Positive outcome for 
employees, value chain, and 
the economy of the 
surrounding communities
C Failure Currently 
underperforming. PE 
and investors will 
lose money
Business did not 
exit 
Potential loss of income to 
employees and value chain. 




Figure 18: PE engagement phases with LBO company. 
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outcome of the investment. PE firm partners and their LBO executives should apply the guidelines 
during the acquisition, planning, and execution phases of the ownership that are shown in figure 
18.  
5.3 Preliminary Recommended Guideline for Debt Size in the Acquisition Phase 
The recommended guidelines that are related to the H2 hypothesis should be implemented 
in the acquisition phase. During this phase, the PE firm performs due diligence. It engages with 
the target company, reviews its financials, meets with its customers, vendors, creditors, and 
leaders, and decides whether they should acquire the company. Some of the decisions a PE firm 
makes during this phase concern the purchase price and the investment mix. Figure 19 depicts the 
first decision making process which covers the size of the debt. 
The process starts with the calculation of the annualized ratio of future debt payments to 
the current R&D budget. If the ratio is greater than 2.5, a technical “due diligence” is required to 
determine whether major R&D investment will be required during the PE ownership. If required, 
the recommendation is to also evaluate the competitive landscape to better understand if deferring 
 

































         
 
 




Figure 19: Process and recommended guidelines to determine the debt size. 
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new product development will destroy value during the ownership. If competitors have or are 
developing better products, the recommendation is to lower the debt size and to increase the equity 
portion of the investment mix, which would enable the LBO to preserve cash for funding essential 
product development projects. 
5.4 Preliminary Recommended Guideline for Building the Executive Team in the 
Planning Phase  
The recommended guidelines that are related to the H3 hypothesis should be implemented 
during the planning phase which covers the second decision-making process, immediately after 
the completion of acquisition. The process in figure 20 captures the recommended steps and 
decisions for the creation of the new executive management team.  
The process starts with the decision on whether to replace or keep the CEO. Once the CEO 
decision is completed and executed, the formation of the executive team process begins. This study 
recommends two parallel tracks. In the first track, the CEO interviews existing executives, their 
peers, and potential successors to decide on who should be replaced or retained. The second track 
 
Figure 20: Management team creation process and guidelines. 
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is designed to mitigate risks that are associated with executive replacements and is focused on 
interviewing a large sample of employees. The purpose of these interviews is to identify risks such 
as: loss of talent, culture change, switching loyalty, and career aspirations of employees that could 
be missed. The interviews should be designed to identify key employees that ought to be retained 
to avoid a reduction in competitive advantage due to talent loss. The recommendations for 
mitigating risks from loss of talent are divided into two groups. The first group covers the rate of 
termination of existing executives to help reduce the impact on employees by limiting the rate of 
executive replacements to no more than 2 in a 6 months period while ensuring that executives with 
product and market knowledge do not depart during the same 6 months period. The second group 
of recommendations is designed to retain key employees that are critical to the success of the 
organization. This process also includes a recommendation for the creation of incentive and 
severance plans that include the key employees and is designed to retain them. 
5.5 Preliminary Recommended Guidelines for the Incentive Plan in the Planning Phase  
The recommended guidelines that are related to the H4 hypothesis should be implemented 
during the planning phase and covers the third decision-making process is the creation of a 
management incentive plan. Figure 21 illustrates 3 components that should be addressed by the 
PE firms. The first component covers the plan for incentivizing the senior management team. The 
stock options value must be high enough to represent a life changing or a strong additional income 
event for the recipients, where the required business performance objectives must be audacious 
but achievable. The second component covers the plan for middle management and key 
employees. The focus here is on retention and therefore the stock options should include a strong 
component that vests over time rather than on meeting performance objectives. The plan should 
also include a long-term bonus plan that is tied to achieving product development objectives and 
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the overall compensation should carry a value of 50-100 percent of the participants’ annual 
income. The third component of the incentive plan targets PE firm partners who should consider 
adjusting the stock option plan as required if the ability to achieve the objectives has been impacted 
by external events.  
5.6 Preliminary Recommended Guidelines for Project Approvals in the Execution Phase 
 The recommended guidelines that are related to the H1 hypothesis should be implemented 
in the execution phase. The fourth and final decision-making process covered in this research study 
is the project approval process which is shown in figure 22. The first decision point is to determine 
whether the product will be developed and released before the PE exits the LBO investment. If the 
answer is positive, then the project should be approved based on its business plan. Otherwise, if 
the product availability is post exit, then the additional question to be considered is whether the 
LBO buyer will receive additional value that could positively influence the financial outcome of 
 
Figure 21: Incentive plan creation process. 
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the exit. If the answer is positive, the project should be approved. Otherwise, the decision point is 
whether the LBO company and its employees, value chain, and surrounding communities will 
receive strong value from the new product. If the answer is positive, this research study 
recommends project approval. 
The next step in this research project is to validate the overarching hypothesis, H1-H4 
hypotheses, and the associated guidelines that are described in this chapter.  
 
Figure 22: Project approval process. 
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CHAPTER 6: VALIDATION OF STRATEGIC GUIDELINES 
6.1 Validation Method and Logistics  
Validating the hypotheses and associated guidelines was an important step in this research 
project. A case study survey utilizing experts was the most logical approach and 7 of the 22 
participants from this study’s survey were selected to participate as experts in the case studies. The 
group of experts, their associated employments, years of experience and area of expertise are 
shown in table 6.  
A survey document was created and included 10 questions listed below that were designed 
to solicit objective feedback used to calibrate the research hypotheses and their associated 
recommended guidelines. A concise PowerPoint document was also created for participants to 
describe the hypotheses and provide visualization of the guidelines discussed in chapter 6 that are 
respectively associated with them. The following is the list of questions in the survey document.  
• Do you agree with the overarching hypothesis “PE practices influence organic R&D 
innovation in PE LBOs”? 
a. Agree 
Table 6: Profiles of expert participants in the case study survey. 
 
Profiles of Case Study Participants
Participant Company Role Experience 
(Years)
Areas of Specialty
1 Company A CEO 35+ Engineering, Operation, Business
2 Company A CFO 25+ Finance
3. Company B CFO 30+ Finance
4. Company B CTO 21+ Product Development, Technology
5 Company C CMO 21+ Engineering, Product Management, Business
6 Company C COO 21+ Business
7. Company D CMO 21+ Business, Product Management, Marketing
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b. Agree with caveats. Please list the caveats 
c. Disagree, please discuss why 
d. If disagree, please provide 1-3 points that either correct or enhance the 
overarching hypothesis 
 
• Do you agree with hypothesis H1 which is: “As the investment period approaches its 
last few years, new product development is not approved by the LBO leadership”? 
a. Agree 
b. Agree with caveats. Please list the caveats 
c. Disagree, please discuss why 
d. If Disagree, please provide 1-3 points that either correct or enhance the 
hypothesis 
 
• Please provide your feedback to the guidelines for H1 as shown in the project approval 
slide “The first decision point is to find whether the product will be developed and 
released before the PE exits the LBO investment. If the answer is positive, then the 
project should be approved based on its business plan. Otherwise, if the product 
availability is post exit, then the additional question to be considered is whether the 
buyer of the LBO will receive additional value that could positively influence the 
financial outcome of the exit. If the answer is positive, the project should be approved. 
Otherwise, the next question to be asked is whether the LBO company and its 
employees, value chain, and surrounding communities will receive strong value from 
the new product. if the answer is positive, this research recommendation is to approve 
the project.” 
a. Agree 
b. Disagree, please discuss why 
c. Agree with caveats. Please list the caveats 
 
• Do you agree with hypothesis H2 which is: “The leadership of an LBO with a large 
debt does not increase R&D spending”? 
a. Agree 
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b. Agree with caveats. Please list the caveats 
c. Disagree 
d. If disagree, please provide 1-3 points that either correct or enhance the 
hypothesis 
 
• Please provide your feedback to the guidelines for H2 as depicted in the debt size slide. 
“The process starts with the calculation of the annualized ratio of debt future payments 
to current R&D budget. If the ratio is greater than 2.5, a technical due diligence is 
required to determine whether major R&D Investment will be required during the PE. 
If required, the recommendation is to also evaluate the competitive landscape to better 
understand if deferring new product development will destroy value during the 
ownership. ownership. If the competitors have or are developing a better product, the 
recommendation is to lower the debt size and to invest more equity in the LBO, which 
would enable the LBO to preserve cash for funding essential product development 
projects.” 
a. Agree 
b. Disagree, please discuss why 
c. Agree with caveats. Please list the caveats 
 
• Do you agree with hypothesis H3: “A significant and rapid change of the leadership 
team results in a large loss of talent”? 
a. Agree 
b. Agree with caveats. Please list the caveats 
c. Disagree 
d. If disagree, please provide 1-3 points that either correct or enhance the 
hypothesis 
 
• Please provide your feedback to the guidelines for H3 as depicted in the Management 
Team slide. “The second decision-making process that is covered in this research 
occurs during the planning phase, immediately after the completion of the acquisition. 
The process shows the recommended steps and decisions for the creation of the new 
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management team. The process starts with the decision on whether to replace or keep 
the CEO. Once the CEO decision is completed and executed, the formation of the 
executive team process starts. This research recommends two parallel tracks. In the first 
track, the CEO interviews existing executives, their peers, and potential successors. 
This process enables the CEO to decide which executives should be replaced or kept. 
The second track is designed to mitigate executive replacements risks and is focused 
on interviewing a large sample of employees. The purpose of these interviews is to 
identify risks such as: talent, culture, loyalty, and career aspiration of employees. The 
interviews should be designed to identify key employees that must be retained to avoid 
reduction in competitive advantage due to talent loss. The recommendations for 
mitigating the loss of talent risks are divided into two groups. The first one is covering 
the rate of replacement of existing executives to help reducing the impact on employees 
by limiting the rate of executive replacements to no more than 2 in a 6 months period 
while making sure that product and market knowledge related executives do not depart 
at the same 6 months period. The second group of recommendations is designed to 
retain the key employees that are critical to the success of the organization. This process 
also includes a recommendation for the creation of incentive and severance plans that 
include the key employees and is designed to retain them.” 
a. Agree 
b. Disagree, please discuss why 
c. Agree with caveats. Please list the caveats 
 
• Do you agree with hypothesis H4 which is: “Stock options plans that are generous and 
achievable motivate the LBO leadership to invest in innovation, or conversely, stock 
Final Version – 08-20-2020 
 54 
options plans that are unachievable or provide unattractive payout, result in a leadership 
team that is unmotivated to invest in innovation”? 
a. Agree 
b. Agree with caveats. Please list the caveats 
c. Disagree 
d. If disagree, please provide 1-3 points that either correct or enhance the 
hypothesis 
 
• Please provide your feedback to the guidelines for H4 “1. Incentivizing the executive 
team: The stock options value must be high enough to represent a life changing or a 
strong additional income event for the recipients, where the required business 
performance objectives must be audacious but achievable; 2. Guidelines for middle 
management and key employees: Here, the focus is on retaining and therefore the stock 
options should include a strong component that vests over time rather than on meeting 
performance objectives. This plan should also include a long-term bonus plan that is 
tied to achieving product development objectives and the overall compensation should 
carry a value of 50-100 percent of the participants’ annual income; 3. Guidelines for 
PE firm partners: Consider adjusting the stock option plan as required if the ability to 
achieve the objectives has been impacted by external events.” 
a. Agree 
b. Disagree 
c. Agree with caveats. Please list the caveats 
 
• Do you believe that these concepts and guidelines could be broadly used for broader 
mergers & acquisitions (M&A)? 
a. Agree 
b. Disagree 
c. Agree with caveats. Please list the caveats   
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The survey was conducted utilizing phone interviews and responses were collected, 
analyzed, and grouped into 5 separate case studies covering the overarching hypothesis, H1-H4 
hypotheses and their associated recommended guidelines where each case study addressed only 
one hypothesis and its recommended guidelines.  
6.2 Results of Case Studies 
6.2.1 Case study 1 
The first case study was designed to calibrate and validate the overarching hypothesis. The 
experts listed in table 6 were surveyed individually and were asked if they agreed with this research 
overarching hypothesis that PE practices influence organic R&D innovation in PE LBOs. Their 
responses are shown in table 7 and provide strong support for the overarching hypothesis. 
Participant #7 added a caveat stating that PE firms also influence business and operational 
performance. 
6.2.2 Case study 2 
Hypothesis H1 in this research project states that as the investment period approaches its 
last few years, new product development is not approved by the LBO leadership. Case study 2 was 
designed to calibrate and validate H1 as well as its associated recommended guidelines that are 
Table 7: Responses of the expert participants from case study 1. 
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described in section 5.6 and figure 22. The experts were surveyed and each was asked to respond 
to questions 2 and 3 in section 6.1. Survey results show that the experts agreed with the hypothesis 
and the recommended guidelines and provided a number of suggestions and caveats that are 
captured in table 8. New input was provided about PE firms indicating that some of them focus on 
acquiring high growth companies while others focus on mature low growth. Three of the experts 
believed that PE LBOs that are operating in mature, low-growth markets apply more scrutiny to 
the project approval process than LBOs that operate in high-growth markets. 
Participant #1 stated that projects could be approved late in the investment period if the 
LBO can show that it cannot exit the investment without the project outcome. This participant also 
felt that a project might be approved if the project outcome adds value to the buyer. Participant #2 
felt that the hypothesis should be revised to be less aggressive. It should replace “is not approved” 
with “is more scrutinized” and should read as follows: “as the investment period approaches its 
Table 8: Responses of the expert participants from case study 2. 
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last few years, new product development is more scrutinized by the LBO leadership”. Participant 
#4 felt that the main objective late in the investment is to increase earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA). However, a buyer that follows a strong “due diligence” 
process will not be interested in acquiring a company that has a “starved” R&D organization. This 
is because the acquirer will have to significantly increase R&D investment which could impact the 
ROI. Participant #5 strongly agreed with the hypothesis stating that the PE firm will never realize 
the benefits and therefore they should conserve cash. Participant #6 believed that only high-risk 
projects such as a new product or a functionality that enables entry to a new market should not be 
approved.  
The experts also provided solid feedback on the recommended guidelines. Participant #1 
suggested to enhance the “value to buyer?” decision box and to insert two additional decision 
boxes. The first box should be added in order to understand whether the project is part of an 
offensive or a defensive strategy and the second box in order to understand whether the buyer is 
strategic or financial. This is important since a strategic buyer will see the value of an offensive 
strategy in the form of a new product introduction while a financial buyer will be more interested 
in defensive strategy that only enhances existing product and protects their investment. Participant 
#2 expanded the definition of “value to buyer” suggesting that revenue growth, profitability, and 
market synergy should be part of the discussion. It was important that the approval of the project 
will contribute to the buyer’s profitability and growth. Participant #6 felt that the “product 
availability” box could represent a lesser investment such as a demonstrable product concept, a 
committed backlog, or customer testimonials. This expert also felt that the “value to buyer” should 
be changed to “value to seller” since the seller (PE LBO) can increase the value of the business by 
making the correct decision. Lastly, participant #7 felt that the recommended guidelines should be 
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used in a mature market and strongly suggested to remove the decision box “value to LBO, 
employees, value chain, and surrounding communities”. 
6.2.3 Case study 3 
Hypothesis H2 states that the leadership of an LBO with a large debt does not increase 
R&D spending. Case study 3 was designed to calibrate and validate H2 as well as its associated 
recommended guidelines that are described in section 5.3 figure 19. The experts were surveyed 
and each of them was asked to respond to questions 4 and 5 in section 6.1. The results of the survey 
show that the experts agreed with the hypothesis and the recommended guidelines and provided 
numerous of suggestions and caveats that are captured in table 9. Three of the experts believed 
that PE LBOs that operate in mature, low-growth markets leverage the LBO and do not increase 
R&D spend. Participant #1 believed that “does not increase” as stated in the hypothesis was a 
strong statement and believed that the LBO leadership was more resistant to increasing R&D. This 
Table 9: Responses of the expert participants from case study 3. 
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participant also felt that the creditors do not support long-term investments that could impact 
interest payments that they receive and therefore many of them enforce their philosophy by adding 
strong covenants to the debt agreement. On the other hand, this participant believed that an increase 
in R&D spend that could save the business should be approved. Participant #2 stated that some 
LBOs need every bit of cash and therefore will not increase R&D spend. Participant #4 added that 
an increase will not occur if the debt is backed by covenants. Participant #6 further made the case 
that R&D spend will be reduced when covenants are in place. 
The experts also provided valuable feedback on the recommended guidelines where most 
suggested to use a leverage ratio, defined as the debt size divided by the EBITDA, for the 
measurement of the debt size. Participant #1 stated that PE firms aim to sell at a higher multiple 
of EBITDA than they bought while paying off the debt over the ownership period. As a result, 
controlling the free cash flow and EBITDA in compliance with the covenants is what the LBO 
leadership is forced to do. Participant #2 added that the leverage ratio should use the adjusted 
EBITDA in the calculation which includes the removal of one-time charges from the EBITDA. 
This participant stated that there are two types of lenders, one lends under the leverage ratio of 2.5 
and the other above 2.5 and suggested to add another step that performs a lightweight due-diligence 
for the path of < 2.5 leverage ratio. This expert suggested to extend due diligence to customers in 
the areas of credit, revenue concentration, and the type of revenues (recurring or one time). Lastly, 
this expert suggested to also consider a decision box on whether the acquired company (LBO) has 
lines of business that could be sold. Participant #4 explained that valuation formulas are the product 
of a constant multiplied by the EBITDA. The constant is dubbed “market multiples” and is market 
dependent. The expert explained that every $1M in additional R&D spend reduces the sale value 
by the market multiples of EBITDA times $1M, and every additional $1M that is contributed by 
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the new product to EBITDA, adds the market EBITDA multiples times $1M to the company value. 
For example, if the market multiple is 8, then every $1M of additional R&D spend, reduces the 
sale value by $8M and on the other hand, any additional $1M of product contribution to EBITDA, 
increases the value by $8M. This expert also suggested to add R&D due diligence to the guidelines 
and that the R&D base and incremental levels should be defined. Base level is the minimum level 
of R&D spend that is required to maintain the products, while incremental level is the R&D spend 
that is required to enhance the product. Participant # 6 stated that the PE firm decides on the 
leverage ratio based on a strategy that it follows and practices.  
6.2.4 Case study 4 
Hypothesis H3 states that a significant and rapid change within the leadership team 
results in a large loss of talent. Case study 4 was designed to calibrate and validate H3 as well as 
its associated recommended guidelines that are described in section 5.4 figure 20. The experts were 
surveyed and each of them was asked to respond to questions 6 and 7 in section 6.1. The results of 
the survey show that the experts agreed with the hypothesis and the recommended guidelines and 
offered a number of suggestions and caveats that are captured in table 10. All the experts agreed 
that it is wise to replace members of the executive team. One reason is that incumbent executives 
could be too myopic in their ways and unable to think beyond their comfort zone. Another reason 
is that they have been with the company and the market for too long and are lacking the energy 
that is required to take the company in a new direction. Participant #2 stated that newly hired 
executives must fit into the company culture, understand the CEO’s mission, and have the mental 
capacity to execute it.  Towards that end, participant #7 suggested that the CEO should hire leaders 
that will work towards what the CEO desires to achieve. On the topic of loss of talent, participant 
#1 asserted that when an executive is replaced, the next layer of management is impacted while 
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most employees are not. Participant #5 believed that a large and rapid loss of executives creates a 
ripple effect through the organization and could result in significant loss of knowledge. 
Participants #6 and #7 stated that the next layer of management carries strong business and product 
knowledge and provides the needed expertise that is required to mitigate the sudden exit of a 
knowledgeable executive. Lastly, participants #1 and #6 suggested to modify the wording of the 
hypothesis. Participants #1 suggested to soften the language slightly by replacing “will result” with 
“can result”, and participant #6 suggested to replace “talent” with “knowledge”.  
The experts also provided valuable feedback on the recommended guidelines. Participants 
#2 and #4 asserted that the “retain key employees” box should also include promotability of 
employees. Participants #1 and #3 suggested to change the numbers in the box “maintain exec 
team knowledge” to percentages since numbers could be influenced by market and company size. 
Table 10: Responses of the expert participants from case study 4. 
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Participant #1 also recommended to replace “evaluate executive team” with “build executive 
team” and was also skeptical about an incumbent CEO terminating one of his/her executives after 
the acquisition. Lastly, participant #2 suggested to change the title of the box “minimize talent 
loss” with “control loss of knowledge”. 
6.2.5 Case study 5 
Hypothesis H4 states that stock options plans that are generous and achievable 
motivate the LBO leadership to invest in innovation. Conversely, stock options plans that 
are unachievable or provide unattractive payout, result in a leadership team that is 
unmotivated to invest in innovation. Case study 5 was designed to calibrate and validate H4 as 
well as its associated recommended guidelines that are described in section 5.5 figure 21. 
The experts were surveyed and each of them was asked to respond to questions 8 and 9 in 
section 6.1. Survey results show that the experts agreed with the hypothesis and the recommended 
guidelines although they provided several suggestions and caveats that are captured in table 11. 
Participant #3 recommended to change the beginning of the hypothesis with a condition “Given a 
long-term goal of achieving innovation,” stock options plans that are generous and achievable 
motivate the LBO leadership to invest in innovation. Conversely, stock options plans that 
are unachievable or provide unattractive payout, result in a leadership team that is 
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unmotivated to invest in innovation, which will emphasize the relationship between innovation 
and time. 
Participant #7 asserted that the PE firms’ philosophy on incentive plans evolved over the 
years and is becoming less generous in their stock options plans by linking them closely to their 
financial success.  
The experts also provided valuable feedback on the recommended guidelines. Participants 
#1 asserted that the annual compensation should have some relationship to the end value of the 
stock options. This expert also believed that the PE partners should work with the CEO to adjust 
the stock options plans according to market conditions. Expert #1 stated that the annual 
compensation that includes salary and bonus should be driven by market and company dynamics 
and suggested to adjust item 3 in the “Steps to Motivate Innovative Behavior” box. One 
recommended change is to remove the percentages and the other is to change “bonus” to 
Table 11: Responses of the expert participants from case study 5. 
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“compensation”. Participant #2 asserted that the stock options and the bonus plan objectives must 
be aligned with the PE objectives. Expert #2 also believed that if the PE firm profits from its 
investment, then the LBO executives should also profit from their incentive plans. This expert also 
believed that the percentage of the bonus plan income in relationship to the stock options value 
should be reviewed. Participant #4 stated that the incentive plan is critical for motivating the 
leadership team and therefore the CEO must communicate the plan effectively to ensure that all 
the leaders understand it. Each person who is a recipient of stock options and annual bonus must 
understand the company’s strategy, milestones, and how it is achievable from his or her 
perspective.  Lastly, participant #7 felt that no person on the LBO team should be well 
compensated through the incentive plan if the PE firm is not making profit on its investment.  
6.3 Calibration of Hypotheses and Recommended Guidelines 
 Results from the case studies were analyzed, and modifications were introduced to the 
hypotheses and the recommended guidelines to reflect the experts’ feedback. The following 
sections describe the calibrated hypotheses and guidelines. 
6.3.1 Calibrated H1 and recommended guidelines 
 Based on the information that was collected, H1 which previously stated the following: as 
the investment period approaches its last few years, new product development is not 
approved by the LBO leadership was modified to state the following: as the investment period 
approaches its last few years, new product development is more scrutinized by the LBO 
leadership. The recommended guidelines were also modified to include changes that the experts 
proposed and are depicted in figure 23. The changes include decision points to ascertain if the 
project is part of an offensive or defensive strategy. The project should be approved if it is part of 
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an offensive strategy and the buyer is strategic, or if it is part of a defensive strategy and the buyer 
is financial. 
6.3.2 Calibrated H2 and Recommended Guidelines 
 Based on the collected information, H2 as stated, received a majority support and did not 
require any modifications. H2 states that the leadership of an LBO with a large debt does not 
increase R&D spending. The recommended guidelines received sufficient feedback to justify 
modifications that are depicted in figure 24. The areas of change are annotated with the ‘*’. The 
most significant change was replacing the financial ratio from “debt payments/R&D budget” to 
the leverage ratio “Debt Size/EBITDA”. 
  
 
Figure 23: Project approval recommended guidelines – Final. 
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6.3.3. Calibrated H3 and recommended guidelines  
 Based on the collected information, H3 which stated the following: a significant and rapid 
change of the leadership team results in a large loss of talent, was modified to a significant 
and rapid change of the leadership team can result in a large loss of knowledge. The 
recommended guidelines were modified to include the suggestions that were provided by the 
experts and are depicted in figure 25. The areas of change are annotated with the ‘*’. One change 
was the addition of “promotability and opportunities” to the “Retain Key Employees” box. The 
most significant change was the removal of constant numbers in the “Maintain Exec Team 
Knowledge” box and the introduction of the “Business Knowledge Acquisition” X variable and 
the “% Leadership Termination Limit” Y variable. The purpose of the change is to make the 
recommendation generic and applicable to most product companies since the time to acquire the 
knowledge differs for each market, company, and product. A good example will be a mid-size 
 
Figure 24: Process and recommended guidelines to determine the debt size. 
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company that operates in the financial market and produces communication solutions for the 
banks. If the company has one SVP of product management, one SVP of R&D and the time for a 
new executive to become proficient with the market and the product line is 3 months, then X=3 
and Y=1 in order to retain one of the SVPs during the 3-months period of bringing a new executive 
to the right proficiency level.  
 
6.3.4 Calibrated H4 and recommended guidelines 
 Based on the collected information, H4 which stated the following: stock options plans 
that are generous and achievable motivate the LBO leadership to invest in innovation, and 
conversely, stock options plans that are unachievable or provide unattractive payout, result 
in a leadership team that is unmotivated to invest in innovation was modified accordingly.  
The hypothesis now states that Given a long-term goal of achieving innovation, stock options 
 
Figure 25: Management team creation process and guidelines. 
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plans that are generous and achievable motivate the LBO leadership to invest in innovation, 
and conversely, stock options plans that are unachievable or provide unattractive payout, 
result in a leadership team that is unmotivated to invest in innovation. 
The recommended guidelines were modified to include the suggestions that were provided 
by the experts and are depicted in figure 26. The areas of change are annotated with the ‘*’. The 
only change is the addition of the importance of motivating the participants through a thorough 
communication of the incentive plan methodology, objectives, and financial rewards.   
 
Figure 26: Incentive plan creation process -Final. 
 
Final Version – 08-20-2020 
 69 
CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
7.1 Discussion 
7.1.1 Validating research study hypotheses 
The objective from this research project is to recommend a set of guidelines that will help 
improve the success rate of PE firms in their pursuit of a successful outcome for their investors. 
Recommended guidelines were created in association with the hypotheses in the form of process 
flows. Since the tested hypotheses and the recommended guidelines required further validation by 
industry experts, a new set of case study surveys were conducted with 7 experts. These experts 
were specifically selected from the group of 22 LBO executives from 4 PE LBOs that participated 
in the first survey. Chosen experts viewed the hypotheses and the recommended guidelines for the 
first time during the interviews and their feedback to the questionnaire helped calibrate the 
hypotheses and the recommended guidelines. Therefore, this research study is based on results 
from the two surveys. Four hypotheses (H1-H4) were developed and validated by the survey data 
and then calibrated based on the results from the second survey. In particular, for the first 
hypothesis (H1), we demonstrated that as the investment period approaches its last few years, 
new product development is more scrutinized by the LBO leadership. We also showed that 
the leadership of an LBO with a large debt does not increase R&D spending as stated in the 
second hypothesis (H2). We confirmed our prediction from the third hypothesis (H3), that a 
significant and rapid change of the leadership team can result in a large loss of knowledge 
and correlated significantly with reduction in business performance. Lastly, we validated the fourth 
hypothesis (H4), that given a long-term goal of achieving innovation, stock options plans that 
are generous and achievable motivate the LBO leadership to invest in innovation. 
Conversely, stock options plans that are unachievable or provide unattractive payout, result 
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in a leadership team that is unmotivated to invest in innovation. We demonstrated H4 by 
showing the influence of the incentive plan on innovation and long-term success. Notably, the PE 
firm that imposed the strictest guidelines for the options plan created an unmotivated management 
team with a potentially poor business outcome.  
One additional case study was designed to ascertain whether the recommended guidelines 
are limited to the PE industry or whether they can be applied in the broader M&A market. The 
following section discusses the portability of our recommended guidelines to apply to the broader 
M&A market.  
7.1.2 Recommended guidelines 
As part of the expert case study survey, participants were asked for their input on whether 
the recommended guidelines in chapter 5 could be used in the broader M&A market. The results 
of the survey are captured in table 12. All participants agreed that most of the recommended 
guidelines could be used in broader M&A. Participant #1 stated that the guidelines will be a great 
tool for small companies that cannot afford the expensive consulting firms. He also added that 
MBA programs and young business major graduates will benefit from these guidelines. Participant 
#2 stated that some PE firms already use handbooks to acquire and manage LBOs and that these 
recommended guidelines could be used by many other firms. Participant #3 drilled down into each 
of the recommended guidelines. This expert stated that for H1 the acquired company should 
approve a project if the product will increase the value for the buyer. H2 guidelines were not 
applicable in the broader M&A unless acquisitions were financed by creditors. H3 was very 
applicable for the acquiring company, and H4 guidelines should be used by acquiring companies 
who are applying a market expansion strategy and seek to retain the executive team and key 
employees. Participant #5 similarly analyzed each set of recommended guidelines. This expert felt 
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that H1 is valid and the acquired company will most likely not invest in R&D prior to its potential 
acquisition. H3 guidelines were ideal for market expansion and consolidation strategies, and H4 
was very useful for market expansion strategy. Participant #6 thought that the recommended 
guidelines are relevant based on the company’s thesis and the strategic direction that it is taking. 
Participant #7 felt that the acquired company should consider utilizing some of the guidelines to 
be correctly positioned for acquisition. This expert also asserted that the guidelines are relevant 
for a company that is acquiring another company as part of a diversification strategy where it is 
important to retain the leadership, the R&D talent, and to have the correct leverage ratio, while not 
very useful for horizontal integration where the acquiring company is mostly interested in the 
customer base and will focus on resource consolidation. The aforementioned comments were 
compiled and entered into table 13 to provide a succinct visualization of the applicability of the 
recommended guidelines in the market. 
 
Table 12: Responses of the expert participants from case study 6. 
 
Case Study #6 - Guidelines Applicability to Broad M&A
Response Caveats
1 Agree  Could be good for small companies that cannot afford expensive consulting firms
 Could be good for MBA programs and for young business graduates
2 Agree  Some PE firms use a handbook of guidelines
 Can be used by many companies
3 Agree
4 Agree  H1 - The acquired company should approve if the product will increase the value for the buyer
 H2 - Not sure
 H3 - Yes
 H4 - Should be focused on retaining if it is market expansion
5 Agree  H1 - Acquired company will not invest prior to acquisition
 H3 - Market expansion or consolidation
 H4 - Market expansion
6 Agree  What is the thesis? 
 Changing direction or not?
7 Agree  Not relevant for horizontal integration M&A strategy
 Relevant for diversification strategy where it is important to retain the leadership, the R&D talent, to have the correct 
leverage ratio, etc. 
 The acquired company should consider utilizing some of the guidelines to be correctly positioned for acquisition
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7.2  Conclusion 
7.2.1 Private equity market implications 
The purpose of this research study was to investigate the influence of leadership on 
innovation in PE LBOs, exploring hypotheses about factors that impact innovation and how they 
may correlate to LBO failures. We have successfully validated the overarching study hypothesis 
that PE practices influence organic R&D innovation in PE LBOs. We also validated 4 hypotheses 
based on a survey that was conducted with 22 participants that served in key executive roles in 4 
LBO companies and possessed unique knowledge that was valuable for this research project. 
Accordingly, we developed 4 recommended guidelines in the form of flowcharts that are 
associated with the 4 hypotheses and are designed to ensure successful PE investment outcome. 
We conducted a second survey, this time in the form of a case study and with a more selective 
group of 7 top executives from our initial survey, and successfully validated the overarching 
hypothesis, the 4 hypotheses from this research and the 4 recommended guidelines. The valuable 
Table 13: Applicability of the recommended guidelines in the broader M&A market. 
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feedback that was received was also instrumental in calibrating the hypotheses and the 
recommended guidelines. We believe that following these guidelines will improve the outcome of 
a PE investment. A successful outcome for the investors will also bring success and prosperity to 
their LBOs’ employees, the LBOs’ value chain, and the economy for their surrounding 
communities. 
7.2.2 Broader M&A market implications 
 As part of the second set of surveys, we also conducted a special case study survey (case 
study #6) to determine whether our guidelines are also applicable in the broader M&A market. 
The 7 experts that were interviewed believed that the guidelines are very applicable to a broader 
market and provided additional input that clarifies whether the acquired or acquiring company 
should be implementing the recommended guidelines. In the case of H1, the acquired company 
should use the guidelines for H1 as part of a strategy to be acquired. H2 guidelines should be used 
by the acquiring company if they will use creditors to acquire the target business.  H3 and H4 
guidelines should be used by the acquiring company if their strategy is market expansion where 
the acquired management team must be retained and motivated to deliver the results that the 
acquiring company is expecting. The impact of M&A transactions on the US economy, employees, 
investors, and to the value chain is tremendous considering data that shows over 12,700 M&A 
deals in 2019. 
7.2.3 Theoretical implication for Technology Management 
This research project investigated the impact of PE firms on organic R&D innovation in 
their portfolio companies. The survey data and additional information that was retrieved from the 
participating executives in the initial survey and from the expert participants in the following case 
study surveys, touches on a number of Technology Management (TM) topics that can benefit from 
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this research. The specific TM subjects that can benefit from this research are Strategic 
Management, Innovation Strategies, Product Development, and Mergers & Acquisitions. 
Additional TM implications are that the overarching hypothesis validates the impact of leadership 
on innovation in M&A and that this research clearly highlights the critical role of leadership in 
high-risk decision making in mid-size companies. Lastly, the recommended guidelines are 
designed to enable leadership to make consistent TM decisions that will enhance the business 
value. 
7.2.4 Limitations 
 Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, many potential participants were inaccessible. The original 
research plan called for 6 PE LBOs and 24 interview participants. The plan also called for 3 
successful and 3 failed LBOs. The implementation only included 22 participants from 4 PE LBOs, 
of which, 3 were successful and only 1 failed. Three of the 4 LBOs were low growth companies 
that operated in a mature market and one of the 4 LBOs was a high growth company. Some of the 
above limitations can be addressed in future research. 
7.2.5 Future research 
This research study was focused on the influence of PE firms on innovation in their acquired 
LBOs. We investigated 4 factors, proposed an overarching hypothesis and 4 hypotheses (H1-H4) 
covering 4 PE LBOs. Due to the limitations that are mentioned in section 7.2.4, this research can 
be expanded to include additional LBOs and participants (≥6 LBOs and ≥ 4 participants for each 
LBO). The number of failed LBOs should be increased to balance the number of successful LBOs. 
It will also be beneficial to include in future research companies from other industries to show that 
the research results are industry agnostic. Similarly, future research may also include a balanced 
mix of low growth and high growth companies. Another objective for future research will be to 
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compare and contrast the PE investments in organic and inorganic innovation practices and to 
determine whether the 4 factors in this research should be expanded or changed. Once the data is 
collected and analyzed, future research should expand to correlate the data with data from public 
datasets and public filings. A new research phase should be added in the form of a proof of concept 
(POC). The POC should include 2-3 companies that will agree to apply the recommended 
guidelines in their business practices and provide feedback on their usefulness. Following the POC 
phase, future research may utilize the input from the POC participants to further calibrate and 
perfect the guidelines.  
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investments. If you choose to participate, you will be asked to meet with the principal 
investigator (PI), Mr. Israel Hersh, for a 1 hour interview where you will be answering 
questions that Mr. Hersh prepared in advance. 
• Your participation in this research study is voluntary. You may choose not to participate. If 
you decide to participate in this research survey, you may withdraw at any time. Whatever 
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2.1. What is the research study about and why are we doing the research study? 
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ownership? (2) Is it possible for PE LBOs to be innovative despite the short-term horizon of their 
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The collected data will be aggregated and analyzed to provide a recommendation that may improve the 
success rate of PE firms in their pursuit of a financially rewarding outcome for their investments. 
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2.2.  How long will the research last? 
We expect that you will be in this research study for 1 hour – the duration of the interview. 
2.3.  How many people will be studied? 
We expect about 54 participants in this research study. 
 
3. WHO MAY PARTICIPATE IN THE STUDY 
 
3.1.  What happens if I say yes, I want to be in this research? 
If you agree to take part in this study, the PI of this study will request an interview meeting with you. The 
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scan and email back to the PI. The time devoted to the consent review should not exceed 10 minutes. It is 
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receive the interview questions by email. This will help you prepare for the interview. During the 
interview, whether it is in-person, video, or phone call, the PI will start by explaining the purpose of the 
study and proceed to ask the same questions in the questionnaire that were emailed to you prior to the 
interview. The questions are close-ended with multiple-choice answers. After each question is asked, you 
can state your answer and the PI will circle your answer on his printed questionnaire. It is expected that 
the interview duration will be under 1 hour. 
 
3.2.  What happens if I say no, I do not want to be in this research? 
You may decide not to take part in the research and it will not be held against you. 
 
3.3. What happens if I say yes, but I change my mind later? 
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company identifiers. The PI will be the only person that knows the encryption code, which will be stored 
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form of a personal interview. The participants’ list, contact information, company names and consent 
forms will be maintained by the PI only, kept on his password-protected laptop, and destroyed after the 
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refuse to answer any of the questions and may request a break at any time during the interview. You may 
end your participation in this study at any time. 
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There are no direct benefits to you for participating in this study. 
 
5. CONFIDENTIALITY OF SUBJECT RECORDS 
 
5.1. What happens to the information you collect? 
We will make every effort to protect your personal information and limit access only to individuals who 
have a need to review this information. Organizations that may inspect your information include the IRB 
and other representatives of this organization. 
Your identifiable information (name, address, company) collected for this research study will not be used 
or distributed to other investigators for future research studies, even if your identifiers are removed. 
Following the completion of the data collection phase, the PI will analyze the data utilizing various 
statistical methods to validate or invalidate the research hypothesis and to provide answers to the research 
questions stated in the Objectives section above. The data will be correlated to available public data. 
Personal and company related information will never be published and will be destroyed at the end of the 
research. 
 
5.2. Can I be removed from the research without my OK? 
The person in charge of the research study can remove you from the research study without your 
approval. A possible reason for removal is if you decide to cancel the interview. 
5.3. What else do I need to know? 
5.3.1 The research study involves no more than minimal risk.  
5.3.2 Participants will not get paid to participate in the research. 
 
6. CONTACT INFORMATION 
 
6.1. Who can I talk to? 
If you have questions or concerns about this research, you may contact Israel J Hersh, Ph.D. candidate of 
Technology Management, College of Engineering, Business, and Education, University of Bridgeport. 
Contact information is +12032577368 (M), ihersh@my.bridgeport.edu. The faculty advisor is Dr. Ruba 
Deeb, +12035764399 (W), rubadeeb@bridgeport.edu. 
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Final Version – 08-20-2020 
 84 
University of Bridgeport Informed Consent Page 4 of 4  
[UB HRP-502 Revised 06/18/2019] 
 
Signature Block for Capable Adult: Long Form 
 
Your signature below documents your permission to take part in this research and to the use and 
disclosure of your protected health information: 
 




   Signature of subject        Date 
 
 
   Print name of subject 
 
 
 Signature of person obtaining consent       Date 
    
  
 Printed name of person obtaining consent      Form Date 
 
  
June 25, 2020 
June 18, 2019 
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Appendix C – 1st Case Study Survey Questionnaire 
Dear Participant, 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this survey. Your experience as an executive who 
worked for a company that was acquired by a private equity (PE) firm is very important. The 
intent of this survey is to collect data that will help answer a number of research questions and 
validate or invalidate a number of hypotheses. The PE transactions that are of interest to this 
research include technology companies and are a single acquisition rather than a combination of 
multiple acquisitions that were merged or became inter-dependent. We seek your input if your 
company was acquired by a PE firm and continued to function under the ownership of the PE as 
a single entity. It is important for the study that you answer all questions. However, if you are 
uncomfortable with answering any question(s), it is acceptable that you not provide an answer. 
Your responses to questions within the survey will be presented in an aggregated form with other 
participants’ responses. Personal or company information will be kept confidential and will not 
be included in the dissemination of research results. The preferred survey method is an in-person 
interview of 1 hour, however, a video conference or a telephone call of similar length is an 
acceptable alternative. Again, your feedback is important, thank you for your participation in this 
survey.  
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Prerequisites  
Was the PE transaction for acquiring your company a single acquisition? 
a. Yes 
b. No (It was a combination of several acquisitions) 
 
Proceed with the questionnaire only if the answer to the question above is “Yes” 
Background  
1. What was the previous ownership type of your company? 
a. Public 
b. Privately owned 
c. PE 
d. Others 
e. Don’t know 
2. How long did the PE own your company? 
a. Less than 3 years 
b. 3 to 4 years 
c. 5 to 7 years 
d. 8 to 10 years 
e. >10 years 
f. Don’t know 
3. What was your position in the company? 
a. CEO 
b. Officer (EVP, SVP, CXO, VP) 
c. Middle Management (VP, Director, Senior Manager) 
d. Manager 
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e. Other 
4. Were you already an employee at your company before it was acquired by the PE? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
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Investments  





e. Above 40% 
f. Don’t know 




d. Under 70% 
e. Don’t know 




c. Don’t know 
4. What were the sources of the additional investments? 
a. Equity 
b. Loan 
c. Combination of a and b 
d. Cashflow 
e. Others 
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f. N/A 
g. Don’t know 
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Incentives & Retention  
1. What incentives did you receive to be aligned with the ownership and their strategy? 
(Select all that apply) 
a. High Salary 
b. Stock Options 
c. Annual Bonus 
d. High salary and Stock Options and Annual Bonus 
e. Stock Options and Annual Bonus 
f. None of the above 
g. Others 
2. Stock Options 
a. Restricted stock – with full vesting 
b. Vesting was time based 
c. Vesting was performance based 
d. Vesting was a combination of b & c 
e. Vesting was combination of a & b 
f. N/A 
3. What management team layer received stock options?  
a. Officers only – (CEO & EVPs, SVPs, CXOs, VPs) 
b. Middle and upper management (Directors, VPs and above) 
c. All management 
d. Key employees and management 
e. Other 
f. Don’t know 
4. How meaningful were the stock option grants to you? 
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a. Life changing event 
b. Strong additional income 
c. Nice to have 
d. N/A 
5. Annual Bonus 
a. < 30% of salary 
b. 31-40% of salary 
c. 41-60% of salary 
d. > 60% of salary 
e. N/A 
6. Did you have a severance package? 
a. <= 3 months 
b. <= 6 months 
c. < 12 months 
d. 1 year 
e. >1 year 
f. No 
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Employee Turnover 
1. Did the PE replace the CEO? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Don’t know 





e. Don’t know 





e. Don’t know 
4. Duration of the exec team restructuring 
a. <1 year 
b. 1-2 years 
c. Restructuring did not occur 
d. Other 
e. Don’t know 
5. Was there a major loss of talent as a result of restructuring? 
a. Yes 
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b. No 
c. Don’t know 
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Market 
1. Market size- total addressable market 
a. < $500M 
b. < $1B 
c. $1B - $2B 
d. > $2B 
e. Don’t know 
2. Define the market 
a. Mature 
b. Low growth (single digit annually) 
c. High growth (over 20% annually) 
d. Combination of a and b 
e. Combination of a and c 
f. Combination of b and c 
g. Combination of a, b and c 
h. Don’t know 
3. Market share 
a. < 30% 




f. Don’t know 
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Innovation 






e. Don’t know 





e. Don’t know 
3. If product development investments increased, in what year of the PE ownership did it 
happen? 
a. First year 
b. First 2 years 
c. First 3 years 
d. Year 3-6 
e. Through the entire ownership 
f. N/A 
g. Don’t know 
4. Product development investments increase pattern 
a. One time increase and then reduced to year 1 level 
b. One time increase and then stayed flat through the ownership period 
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c. Year over year increase 
d. Increased as needed 
e. N/A 
f. Don’t know 
5. What was the reason for the increase in the R&D budget?  
a. New product 
b. Implementing existing product enhancements 
c. Addressing existing product issues 
d. N/A 
e. Don’t know 
f. Other 
6. How was the current R&D investment funded? 
a. Cashflow 
b. Additional debt 
c. Additional equity 
d. Others 
e. Don’t know 
7. How was the increase in organic product development funded? 
a. Utilized one line of business or product as a cash cow 
b. Sold a line of business 
c. Combination of a and b 
d. Additional debt 
e. Additional equity 
f. N/A 
g. Others 
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h. Don’t know 
8. What was the nature of product development investments during the PE ownership 
a. Enhancement to an Existing market -existing product 
b. A new product in an existing market 
c. Existing product in a new market 
d. A new product in a new market 
e. N/A 
f. Don’t know 
9. What was the nature of m & a related product investments during the PE ownership 
a. Enhancing an existing market with existing product  
b. A new product in an existing market  
c. Existing product in a new market 
d. A new product in a new market 
e. N/A 
f. Don’t know 
10. Product development strategy during the PE ownership 
a. Incremental – enhancing existing product lines – short term releases 
b. Radical/Disruptive – new product, new technology – long-term development 
cycle 
c. Combination of a & b 
d. Don’t know 
e. Other 
f. N/A 
11. What was the average duration of new product development cycle during the PE 
ownership period? 
a. <1 year 
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b. 1-2 years 
c. 2-3 years 
d. >3 years 
e. N/A 
f. Don’t know 
12. Did your company introduce any new flagship products during the PE ownership period? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Don’t know 
13. Did the company approve the development of strategic products that would only 
complete after the exit? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Don’t know 
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Investment Exit  
1. Did the new product(s) influence the success of exit? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
2. Was the PE ownership a financial success for the investors? 
a. Yes 
b. No 




Final Version – 08-20-2020 
 100 
Appendix D – Definitions 
Definitions 
Bonus plan Incentive offered to employees in which they can earn extra money by abiding by various requirements 
CEO Chief Executive Offer 
CFO Chief Financial Officer 
CMO Chief Marketing Officer 
COO Chief Operating Officer 
CTO Chief Technology Officer 
CxO Corporate executives whose job titles typically start with 'Chief' and end with 'Officer.' 
EBITDA Net income (or earnings) with interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization added back 
High growth company Companies generating a return on equity of > 15%  
Leverage ratio Total Debt / EBITDA 
 
Leveraged buyout (LBO) The acquisition of another company using a significant amount of borrowed money to meet the cost of 
acquisition 
Market share Percent of total sales in an industry generated by a particular company 
Mature market The stage where the rate of growth slows, perhaps to zero 
MBA Master of Business Administration 
Midsize company Organization that makes more than $50 million, but less than $1 billion in annual revenue 
M&A Mergers and Acquisitions 
Private Equity (PE) An alternative investment class and consists of capital that is not listed on a public exchange. 
Return on investment 
(ROI) 
A performance measure used to evaluate the efficiency of an investment 
 
Research & Development 
(R&D) 






A team of individuals at the highest level of management of an organization 
 
Severance Plan Provides an employee with severance pay for a specified period of time in the event that his/her 
employment is involuntarily terminated by the Employer 
 
Stock options plan Contracts between a company and its employees that give employees the right to buy a specific 
number of the company's shares at a fixed price within a certain period of time 
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SVP Senior Vice President 
 
Valuation The analytical process of determining the current (or projected) worth of an asset or a company 
 
Value chain Set of activities that a firm performs in order to deliver a valuable product or service for the market. It 
includes row material, supply chain, partners, and customers 
VP Vice President 
2nd Level management Management level that is subordinate to the senior, executive, or upper management 
 
